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CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Aaron Frank
Formerly 3rd Deputy Police Commissioner (Trial Commissioner), City of New York.
If one is to be convicted of a crime, criminal intent must be estab-
lished. The law presupposes sanity and so one is presumed to intend
the natural and probable consequences of his act. A wrong or harm
that is committed as the result of a serious mental disease cannot result
in the conviction of a crime.
Criminologists say that our rules of law remain hampered by early
views of psychiatry. Some say, however, that the rules of law are not
affected by modern views of psychiatry-that it is only a problem of
semantics. This is in conformity with Judge Cardozo's statement that
words are only symbols of things and ideas. In other words, legal rules
may be so interpreted, without being changed, as to give effect to modern
psychological and psychiatric views.
In language, the most important rule of law (in this connection)
is simple. To reiterate preliminarily, if the perpetrator of a wrongful
act is insane, the requisite criminal intent is lacking. The rule was
succinctly set forth in England about 100 years ago in the McNaghten
case and even that statement merely reviewed the well-recognized rule.
A person is deemed insane if, when committing a wrongful act, he
was laboring under such a defect of reason that (a) he did not know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing or (b) if he did know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, he did not know that
he was doing wrong. (See N. Y. Penal Law, Sec. 1120)
Medical men have criticized the McNaghten rule and those of the
legal profession have given thought whether to try to bring about its
revision.
People v. Caruso,1 involved a defendant whose infant child had died.
At the time it appeared to the defendant that the attending doctor
had laughed at the occurrence. The defendant thereupon choked the
doctor until he fell to the floor, then took a knife and stabbed him
twice in the throat-so killing him. The crime was committed as a
result of rash impulse and headlong fury and while the defendant was
in a state of overwhelming grief. In his uncontrollable rage, defendant
did not know what he was doing. There was the intent to kill, but
there was no premeditation and deliberation-terms which imply a
capacity to think and reflect, a will to make a choice, and time to over-
1. 246 N.Y. 437.
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come hesitation and doubt and to form a definitive purpose. "Heat of
blood," like drunkenness, does not absolve one of all consequences of
crime, but these factors mitigate the degree of crime; and so in the
Caruso case the defendant was not deemed guilty of murder in the first
degree. The conviction of first degree murder was reversed and a new
trial was ordered.
In People v. Moran,2 feebleness of mind or will-even though not
so extreme as to justify a finding that the defendant was irresponsible-
was accepted to determine whether there was premeditation and
deliberation. Actually, this was but dictum in the per curiam opinion
because the evidence was not so strong as to require a finding by the
jury that the defendant was irresponsible. He knew the nature and
quality of the act and knew that it was wrong. The judgment upon a
verdict convicting the defendant of the crime of murder in the first
degree was, accordingly, affirmed. Moran was a psychopathic inferior,
with low and unstable mentality and there was possible epilepsy, too.
The dictum in the Moran case reflects a progressive attitude with
respect to the query, if "heat of blood" (sudden and uncontrollable
emotion) and intoxication may be considered by a jury to determine
whether there was premeditation and deliberation, why should not a
deficient mental state be submitted for the jury's consideration. The
question of relative intelligence has a bearing on mental capacity. A
mental defect or disorder may certainly reduce the offense charged
against the defendant to one of lesser degree.3
I.n the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1946, an important
decision was rendered in the Fisher case.4 There the trial court charged
2. 249 N.Y. 179.
3. A recent decision by the N. Y. State Court of Appeals (People V. Ford, decided July
15, 1952) should provoke fruitful discussion. The defendant was convicted of murder in
the first degree. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. The facts are contained in
Judge Desmond's dissenting opinion, concurred in by Chief Judge Loughran. Two
psychiatrists who examined the defendant testified as defense witnesses. Neither thought
there was insanity in accordance with the common law test as embodied in Section 1120 of
the Penal Law. They testified, however, as did other psychiatrists called by the prosecu-
tion, that the defendant was a "psychopathic personality." Defendant's psychiatrists were
of the opinion that he was incapable of premeditation or deliberation. There appeared to
be no "reasonable motivation" for the brutal homicide. From defendant's history there
was much "to mark him as a man who had little judgment or intelligence, and made little
use of what he had." In a desire to show defendant's "limited mental capacity," testimony
of one of the defense psychiatrists was offered with respect to an interview with the
defendant after the injection of sodium amytol--commonly called "truth serum." The trial
court refused to receive the testimony. Defendant's claim of error was not recognized by
the majority of the court. The dissenting opinion pointed out the distinction between a
psychiatrist's testimony as to the factual basis for his opinion (after the use by him of
sodium amytol to "produce drowsiness and uninhibited disclosures," thus testing mental
conditions) and the bare use of a "lie detector" test (which was refused in People V.
Ford, 279 N. Y., 204) to report on whether the truth was told.
4. 328 U.S. 463.
1952]
AARON FRANK
premeditation and deliberation in the traditional manner. It refused
to charge that the jury was to consider factors of psychopathic aggres-
sive tendencies, low emotional response and borderline mental defi-
ciency (that is, partial responsibility). The refusal to charge was not
regarded as erroneous by the majority of the Court. The majority's
viewpoint appears to be less progressive than the dictum expressed by
the N. Y. Court of Appeals in the Moran case in 1928-20 years
before the decision in the Fisher case. Justice Murphy's dissent (Justice
Frankfurter dissented as well) points out, however, that between sanity
and insanity is every shade of disordered or deficient mental condition
and that low mental powers (though one is not insane) may make a
person incapable of deliberating and premeditating.
In considering the sociological aspects of criminal responsibility, it
must first be noted that a concept of society must reflect the doctrine of
benefits and rights and reciprocal duties and responsibilities. Our
society could not function unless one is held responsible for his acts.
The word "responsibility" is used by criminologists in two different
senses. In one sense, it relates to a power that one has over his own
fate. There is the assumption of a free will which most criminologists
deny. That concept of responsibility has been criticized as mere infer-
ence or rationalization. From a strictly scientific point of view, praise
or fault cannot be attached to any individual act. When one's conduct
is examined it must be, at least, in terms of heredity and life experience.
While that first notion of responsibility is being refuted, we must
hold to some other concept of responsibility if society is to continue to
function. This leads to the other aspect of responsibility. A person
must be held accountable for his personal behavior. That is the socio-
logical point of view. It is necessary to society's functioning. It is the
key to human relations in the progress of our civilization.
To refute the concept of free will does not relieve an offender of
accountability, that is, responsibility. This theory has found expression
in the gradual acceptance by our community of a theory of protection
in lieu of punishment that is merely vindictive in character.
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